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1 Introduction
After two decades of bitter confrontation, Russia and China normalized their
bilateral relationship in the１９８０s, and in the nineties made dramatic improvements
in their bilateral political and security relationships. In April １９９６ the two
countries for the first time announced the development of their “strategic
partnership”. Followed in ２００１, the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship,
and Cooperation, signed by Russian President Putin and his counterpart Jiang
Zemin, codified the bilateral ties and the future of the essential equality of the two
states. Then in October２００４, the two countries finally resolved the last of their
long-standing border issues. Since then China and Russia improved their relations
markedly in２００５.
Regarding the economic relationship between Russia and China, some students
of the Sino-Russian studies have pointed out that the economic relationship is the
weakest link in bilateral ties１）. Nevertheless, economic cooperation is becoming a
＊ This paper is a product of the research project on“Russia’s Foreign Labor Management and its
Impact on Domestic Labor Market”（２００６－２００８）, financed by the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science（Grant number:１８４０２０２１）.
１）Sherman Garnett［２００１］“Challenges of the Sino-Russian Strategic Relationship”, p.４６, The
Washington Quarterly, Autumn ２００１; and Yu Bin［２００５］“China and Russia: Normalizing
their Strategic Partnership”, p.２３８, Power Shift , Edited by David Shambaugh,２００５, University
California Press.
more and more important domain in the Sino-Russian partnership. This paper
examines the main features of Sino-Russian economic relationship: trade, investment
and energy co-operation, identifies the problems, and anticipates the prospects.
While highlighting the wide range of common interests involved, the paper
investigates the stumbling blocks for the future development of Sino-Russian
economic relations. Furthermore, ironically, the rapid development of economic
cooperation, in the Chinese leaders and scholars’ views, are mutually beneficial,
however, there are suspicions in Russia that China is getting the bigger part of the
cake and China would harm Russia’s interests in the long term. The“fear of
China”could make the future economic relationship become problematic.
2 Trade development and its problems
2. 1 Trade development
As the Sino-Russia relationship improved in the beginning of the１９８０s, both
governments agreed to restart the border trade which had been stopped for more than
two decades. In１９８２, the two governments signed an agreement to restore the
validity of the１９５８trade agreement. Since then, trade volume started to increase.
In the early１９９０s, traders were allowed to travel across the border without
visas. This facilitated border trade to expand and it did expand rapidly between the
Russian Far East（RFE）regions and the adjoining Chinese regions, most notably
with Heilongjiang province. Another factor that contributed to the trade expansion
was that after the collapse of the USSR in December１９９１ the central subsidies that
had previously sustained these regions were cut drastically, and the local populations
found themselves turning to foreign trade to find the most basic necessities. As a
result, they became increasingly, and in some cases entirely, dependent on Chinese
goods brought over by shuttle traders（chelnoki）. Initially, the Russia regions near
the border welcomed the rapid opening of border trade to address their economic
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needs, however, poor regulations on both sides enabled criminals and unscrupulous
business people to take advantage of the sudden opening of the border. The new
markets catering to the shuttle trade soon became associated with criminal activity.
According to Minakir, criminal activity in the border region peaked in１９９２, and
was popularly attributed to the growing influx of Chinese. In fact, however, the
Chinese turned out to be the victims of criminal racketeering, and not the source.
Many inexperienced Russian firms participated in the mad rush to the border,
leading to vociferous complaints in the RFE about shoddy goods and unscrupulous
Chinese traders. Chinese traders also accumulated their own list of complaints
about the difficulties of doing business in Russia due to the unstable economic
environment and pervasive corruption２）.
The extremely disorderly nature of the transactions and rising crime rates led
Russian authorities to impose border controls in１９９３and to conclude an agreement
with Beijing in １９９４ to establish formal border-crossing posts and tighten visa
restrictions, causing a sharp reduction in Sino-Russian trade which had reached $
７．６８billion in１９９３（second only to the level of Russia’s trade with Germany the
same year）, to fall to $５．０８ billion the following year, a decrease of３６．５ per
cent３）. Sino-Russian trade dropped further by ３４ per cent in １９９４. Because
traditionally, cross-border trade（including shuttle trade）constituted a third of the
bilateral trade, and cross-border trade is linked closely with the mobility of traders
from both countries.
As Table１ indicates, the bilateral trade recovered somewhat in１９９５, reaching
２）Minakir, Pavel A.［１９９６］“Chinese Immigration in the Russian Far East: Regional,
National, and International Dimensions”, Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union:
Implications for Migration Edited by Jeremy R. Azrael, Emil A. Payin, Kevin F. McCarthy,
and Georges Vernez, Rand Cooperation.
３）“Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations and Economic and Technological Cooperation.”
Chinese Embassy in the U. K. http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/Diplomacy/Sino-Russian/
BETRETC.htm. Accessed on March２０,２００４
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$５．４６billion, and it rose to $６．８５ billion in１９９６. However, trade turnover has
not reached the １９９３ level, remaining in the $５－６ billion range. After the
meeting between the Premier Ministers of China and Russia in December１９９６, it
was announced that the two countries’ targeted level of trade would be $２０ billion
annually by year２０００４）. However, because the Russians did not reduce the barriers
on the border, the trade expansion was insignificant. In １９９８, the Russian
economic crisis compounded the problems of high transportation costs and low
population densities in the RFE to leave the provinces of Northeast China with little
hope for their exports５）. In the beginning of１９９９, high-level exchanges of top
trade officials were realized. “Commercializing”Russian-Chinese relations,
therefore, assumed an important and strategic significance６）.
Table１ Chinese-Russian Trade１９９２－２００５
４）Xinhua News Agency“China and Russia agree to build strategic partnership”（as provided by
BBC Worldwide Monitoring）. November１８,１９９６.
５）Rozman, Gilbert［２００４］Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, p.２１４, Cambridge University
Press.
Year Export Import Total
１９９２ ２．３３６ ３．５２６ ５．８６２
１９９３ ２．６９１ ４．９８８ ７．６７９
１９９４ １．５８１ ３．４９５ ５．０７６
１９９５ １．６６５ ３．７９８ ５．４６３
１９９６ １．６９３ ５．１５３ ６．８４６
１９９７ ２．０３２ ４．０８６ ６．１１８
１９９８ １．８３９ ３．６４１ ５．４８０
１９９９ １．４９７ ４．２２２ ５．７２０
２０００ ２．２３３ ５．７７０ ８．００３
２００１ ２．７１０ ７．９５９ １０．６６９
２００２ ３，５２１ ８．４０７ １１．９２８
２００３ ６．０３０ ９．７２８ １５．７５８
２００４ ９．０９８ １２．１２７ ２１．２２５
２００５ １３，２１１ １５．８８９ ２９．１１０
（in US$ billions）
Source: Chinese Customs Statistics.
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After years of mutual efforts to boost bilateral economic relations, a rise in
trade finally registered in １９９９. Since Putin’s presidency, trade has been rising
significantly. During the past five years, the value of Sino-Russian trade has grown
an average２０ per cent annually. In２００５, the trade turnover was up by３７．１ per
cent over２００４（$２９．１ billion）. China is Russia’s fourth-largest trading partner.
And Russia is China’s eighth-largest trading partner, Russia ranks as the second
largest trading partner among China’s European trading partners（after Germany and
ahead of Britain）. Even though bilateral trade volumes amount to only about one
tenth of China’s trade with the United States or with Japan. However, to be fair,
taking into account the fact that China’s foreign trade is increasingly linked with
transnational investment, and the Russian investment in China is quite limited, the
Russia-China trade could be viewed as“ordinary”trade or“pure”trade.
However, the growth of bilateral trade must not be taken at the face value.
This is because the significant bilateral trade turnover growth in２００５ was mainly
due to high global commodity prices. For example, in２００５, crude oil deliveries to
China totaled１２millions tons, up１３．２per cent in terms of volume but６２per cent
higher in terms of value. The deliveries of crude oil to China accounted for５０per
cent of the value increment in trade turnover between the two countries. And other
Russian export items also mirrored this trend. Russian petroleum products exports
to China were down by４per cent year-on-year in volume, but were up by３６．６per
cent in value. Likewise, calcium chloride exports were up by ０．４ per cent in
volume, but３１ per cent in value. As Russian exports to China remain dependent
on international commodity price movements, Russian officials are wary of a
possible global commodity downturn. These numbers make analysts wonder how
bilateral trade turnover could be increased to $６０－８０billion by２０１０which was set
６）Yu Bin［１９９９］“NATO’s unintended Consequences: A Deeper Strategic Partnership…or
More”, p.６８, Comparative Connections, Vol.１No.１.
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as the trade targets by authorities from the two sides, particularly in the event of
lower global commodity prices７）.
2. 2 Trade Structure
Russia and China welcomed the expansion of the trade, however, Russian
officials complained about the unbalanced trade structure between the two countries.
According to the Russian trade representative in China, Sergei Tsyplakov, in２００５,
oil and oil products amount to half of Russian exports to China, and unprocessed
wood makes up another ２５ per cent. On the other hand, Russian machinery
amounts to a mere１．２ per cent of Russian exports to China８）. According to the
Chinese statistics, as shown in Table２, in２００５, oil and oil products amount４１．６
per cent of Russian exports to China, and wood makes up another１１．４ per cent.
Russian machinery amounts to a mere１．１per cent of Russian exports to China.
However, Russia is hardly in a position to complain. In２００５, in Russia’s total
export to the world, oil and oil products amount to６４．３ per cent and wood and
Table２ Commodity Composition of Chinese Imports
７）Interfax, January１９,２００６.
８）Interfax, June５,２００６.
２０００ ２００１ ２００２ ２００３ ２００４ ２００５
Seafood（３） ６．５％ ６．３％ ７．５％ ６．５％ ６．４％ ６．９％
Fuel/energy products（２７） １４．９％ ９．９％ １４．４％ ２０．８％ ３４．５％ ４１．６％
Fertilizer（３１） １０．６％ ７．６％ １０．５％ ６．７％ ７．９％ ８．２％
Forestry, pulp and paper products（４４） ７．５％ ７．７％ １２．８％ １０．５％ １１．９％ １１．４％
Steel（７２） １５．０％ １４．９％ １１．６％ １６．５％ １１．８％ １１．０％
Aluminum（７６） １６．３％ ２．６％ ０．９％ ２．１％ ２．２％ ０．７％
Machinery and mechanical devices（８４） １．８％ ３．８％ ８．０％ ６．０％ １．３％ ０．５％
Transport vessels（８８） １．０％ １９．０％ １１．９％ ５．３％ ２．５％ ０．９％
Optical goods（８９） ０．１％ ４．６％ ０．０％ ０．１％ ０．０％ ０．２％
Source: Chinese Customs Statistics, Calculated by the author.
Note: Commodities are classified according to International Trade Centre（ITC）HS-Codes
（Harmonized System Codes）.
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pulp consist of２０．４ per cent. Meanwhile, Russian machinery and transportation
equipment amount to １．０ per cent９）. So the conclusion is that in general, the
commodity composition of Russian exports to China conformed to Russia’s global
trade profile as a supplier of raw materials, metals, and semi-processed goods.
Regarding the commodity composition of China exports to Russia, it is not
conforming to China’s global trade profile. However, it is on the way of
converging to it.
As Table３ indicates, China exported mainly consumer items to Russia: almost
５６ per cent of Chinese exports to Russia in２００５ were textiles, textile products,
leather goods, and shoes. It was not surprising because China was internationally
recognized as a leading exporter of textiles and related products. However, textiles
and related products comprised only１６．９ per cent of China’s total exports mix in
the year ２００５１０）. With rapid industrialization, China is improving its export
structure. China’s largest export category in ２００５, consisting of ４６．２ per cent,
was machinery and mechanical devices（including electronic goods, TV, etc.）. In
９）JETRO（Japan External Organization）［２００６］Trade and Investment White Paper, p.３３７.
１０）Ibid ., p.１５７
Table３ Commodity Composition of Chinese Exports
２０００ ２００１ ２００２ ２００３ ２００４ ２００５
Leather（４２） ２０．５％ １９．８％ １４．２％ １５．８％ １３．２％ ９．１％
Fur（４３） １．８％ ２．４％ ２．２％ ５．９％ １３．３％ １２．９％
Apparel（６１） １０．９％ ７．０％ ７．８％ ８．６％ ９．１％ ８．１％
Apparel（６２） １５．４％ １２．５％ １２．５％ １３．４％ ８．０％ １２．４％
Textile Fiber（６３） １．９％ ３．０％ １．６％ ３．３％ ３．３％ ４．３％
Footwear & parts thereof（６４） １５．５％ １４．９％ １４．７％ ９．２％ ６．５％ ８．８％
Equipment（８４） ２．７％ ３．７％ ５．７％ ６．０％ ６．２％ ６．５％
Electrical machinery & equipment（８５） ４．１％ ５．９％ ８．９％ ９．２％ ９．７％ １０．２％
Source: Chinese Customs Statistics, Calculated by the author.
Note: Commodities are classified according to International Trade Centre（ITC）HS-Codes
（Harmonized System Codes）.
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２００５, Exports of high-tech products（a general term China customs use which
includes a variety of products such as computers, electronics, aerospace technology,
and telecommunications equipment, among others）grew ３１．８ per cent in ２００５,
accounting for２８．６per cent of all of China’s exports. Nowadays China is not only
capable of manufacturing machine equipment, household electronics, and chemistry
industry, but is also capable of making into the world market. For China’s foreign
trade experts and officials, the improvement in the economic situation in Russia
and the increased purchasing power of the Russian consumers are making Russia an
attractive market for good-quality and inexpensive Chinese goods.
However, Chinese exports of these high-tech items to Russia comprised only
１６．７per cent of the exports mix to Russia, and were disproportionately lower than
its overall share in the Chinese export mix. Chinese exports to Russia thus tended
to concentrated in lower value-added sectors, absent the range of products that
exported to higher-income economies such as the U. S. and Japan. However, high-
tech items exports to Russia are increasing rapidly, by nearly６０per cent in２００５.
On the Chinese import side, among China’s top １０ imports by value, the
commodities that saw the highest growth in ２００５ were base minerals used in
smelting, and mineral fuel and oil. Chinese imports of ore, slag, and ash
commodities rose by５０．６ per cent in２００５, and mineral fuel and oil commodities
increased by３５．５per cent. The fact that these commodity groups saw the largest
amount of growth over the past year indicates that they are increasingly important to
China’s economy and the import potentials will be enormous.
From Table ２ and Table ３, we can see the tendency that the commodity
composition of imports and exports between Russia and China is converging to their
profiles in the world market. Taking account of the future needs of both countries,
this tendency will be growing.
During President Putin’s visit to China in March２００６, he expressed concerns
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about the“raw material bias of Russian exports”. As argued by Lo,“His comments
reflected not just a fear that Russia was being left behind in the race for global
economic competitiveness, but more specifically that it was being overtaken by
China, a developing country”１１）. The Russian president urged the Chinese to
reverse the downward trend in Russia’s machinery exports to China. President Hu,
however, believed that Russian enterprises were“fully capable of achieving a bigger
market share”in China“if they can bring their advantages into play and come up
with competitive products and technology.”In one of the five proposals he made at
the forum, Hu pointed out that enterprises should be the“main force in the
strengthening of international economic and technological cooperation,”and
governments should play a supportive and facilitating role“in their efforts to unfold
mutually beneficial cooperation at different levels and in diverse spheres.”“I
sincerely hope that entrepreneurs in both countries would seek more partners, look
for more opportunities, cooperate more and make still greater contributions in further
promoting Sino-Russian economic and technological cooperation and promoting the
development of strategic partnership between the two countries,”noted Hu. Vice
Premier Wu Yi, chairperson of the forum, too, urged cooperation between large
companies of the two countries, especially on large projects１２）. In the eyes of the
Chinese, the real problem of“unbalanced trade structure”cannot, and should not,
be resolved solely by governmental regulatory means. In fact, the lack of
competitiveness of Russian finished products is the key to the declining role of
Russia’s machinery products in bilateral trade. Russian researchers have realized
and pointed out that the reason for the small share of machinery export to China is
that Russia has powerful competitors in the Chinese market, such as Western nations
１１）Lo Bobo［２００６］“China and Russia: Common Interests, Contrasting Perceptions”, p.１４.
Asian Geopolitics, Chatman House.
１２）Yu Bin［２００６］“China’s Year of Russia and the Gathering Nuclear Storm”, Comparative
Connections, Vol.８No.１.
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and the newly developed Asian countries, which are capable of meeting a large
portion of China’s import needs, and the majority of these companies have set up
their own production lines in China, and have entered into close cooperation with
Chinese manufactures. Unfortunately, Russian companies, due to lack of financial
resources and poor advertising and marketing, are lagging behind their
competitors１３）.
In the numerous Sino-Russian Joint-communiqués, it is emphasized that China
would give top priority to expanding economic relations with Russia and pledged to
take active measures to increase imports from Russia and make special efforts on
cooperation in energy resources, electro-mechanics, and infrastructure construction.
While the lack of competitiveness of Russian products in both Chinese and
international markets cannot be redressed overnight, official pronouncements are yet
to entail any practical results, plans remained for the most part vaguely articulated
and undefined. As no new incentives have been introduced recently to raise
Russian high-tech exports to China. With the economies of both Russia and China
are transiting closer and closer to market economy, the old Soviet style government-
to-government trade has lost and will continue to lose its currency.
2. 3 Discrepancies in the Trade Statistics and its Reasons
Since the beginning of this century, the discrepancy between Russian and
Chinese trade statistics started to grow larger and larger（see Figure１）. In２００５,
it reached $８．８billion. So far the discrepancy between Russian and Chinese trade
statistics has not become a problem but as the Russian trade surplus became smaller
（see Figure１）, it could become a controversial issue one day. The worrisome
１３）Tsyplakov, Sergei and Evgeny Popov［２００３］“Russian-Chinese Trade and Economic
Cooperation: Current Problems and Outlook”, p.７０, Far Eastern Affairs , Vol.３１ No.３;
Lvishin, Sergei［２００６］“２００６: The Year of Russia in China: A New Quality of Partnership”,
p.１２, Far Eastern Affairs , Vol.３４No.１.
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２０．３ 
１４．９ 
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fact about the trade statistics discrepancy is that it is related to illegal trade practices.
China Customs trade statistics（both the export and import numbers）are larger
than the Russia’s. The reason is likely related to the newly implemented and
stricter Chinese customs controls, and tightening of import formalities on the
Chinese side in the most recent ３－４years. Furthermore, normal official Russian
trade statistics underestimated, or even could not grasp the volume and value of
Chinese exports to Russia, and simultaneously underreported the Russia exports to
China. These discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics can be explained by other
more complicated factors.
Figure１ Trade statistics discrepency
Source: Chinese Customs Statistics, Russian Customs Statistics
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２.３.１ Chinese Imports
According to Feng, regarding Chinese imports, most of the discrepancy is
found in three items: seafood, timber and metal１４）.
Seafood imports from Russia, according to Chinese figures, reached $３４０
million in２０００. However, Russian figures for the same period indicate seafood
exports to China were a paltry $４５million. The difference was $２９５million. In
２００４, the difference had reached as high as $７００million. The main reason for this
discrepancy in seafood trade is considered that the seafood has either changed hands
on the waters or Russian boats came to the Chinese port just after fishing, without
going through the Russian Customs. In addition, some of these Russian boats had
neither fishing permits nor licenses to export their catch. The fact that much of the
illegal fishing is overseen or controlled outright by Russian organized-crime
gangsters makes it more difficult to gauge the right number１５）.
In the timber trade, there are not big differences in the quantities but there are
big differences in the values. Trade volumes are understated in Russian statistics１６）.
For example, Russian exporters are more likely to understate exports in order to
evade export duties or approved quotas. Russian customs have also consistently
found evidence of understating export volumes, particularly of logs. On the China
side, because the import tariffs on log are set to be zero but Chinese importers must
１４）Feng Anquan［２００６］“An Analysis of China and Russia’s Trade Statistics-Focusing on the
Trade Discrepancies”, Reported at The Japan Association for Comparative Economic Studies,５th
Autumn Conference, in Kobe, October２８,２００６.
１５）The same tendency was also found in the Japanese-Russian trade. According to Japanese
figures, seafood imports from Russia reached $６８６ million in２０００. Russian figures for the
same period indicate seafood exports to Japan were a paltry $３million. The Japan Fisheries
Association, meanwhile, estimates the illegal seafood trade between Japan and Russia alone is
worth $１．２billion a year, in line with the most plausible Russian estimates, in“The Death of
Sushi?”Far Eastern Economic Review , August１５,２００２.
１６）Lankin, Alexey［２００５］“Forest Product Exports from the Russian Far East and Eastern
Siberia to China: Status and Trends”, Forest Trends Working Paper.
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pay a value-added tax（VAT）of１３ per cent for logs and１７ per cent for sawn
wood, thus, in order to pay less VAT, Chinese importers report their imported
goods as logs, rather than as sawn wood. This could be one of the factors which
contributes to the understating of sawn wood import volumes.
The big differences in the values could be explained by the Chinese customs’
recording method. If the contracted value of log for per cubic meter is below $５０,
it would be recorded as $５０ and then taxed. However, on the Russian side,
sometimes in the contract, the value of log was set far lower than its market price.
As indicated by Lebedev,“in the most popular illegal export model, exporters label
high-quality timber as“pulp logs,”in order to reduce the official contract price.
This strategy is meant to hide company profit on the Russian side and thereby
reduce the profit tax the company must pay to Russia”１７）. Although the Russian
government has set strict export rules, the rules are not fully implemented. “Bribes
may be paid to customs officers at the timber yards and to the police, the militia and
others to ensure the safe passage of illegally harvested timber”１８）.
One thing which needs to be mentioned here is the fact that a timber exporting
company in Russia and an importing company in China could be the same trade
company. Since the late １９８０s, the Chinese started to invest in Russia（see
below）. Most of those enterprises are trading companies. In the RFE and Siberia,
some Chinese ventures are engaged in logging and wood-processing trade. In order
to pay less tax on the Russian sides, these companies declare less volume and value
of the timber. Of course, the Chinese companies pay bribes to Russian officials.
The situation with metal trade is similar, illegal activities are widespread, such
as under-declaring export volume and value, mislabeling minerals. This contributed
１７）Lebedev, Anatoly［２００５］“Siberian and Russian Far East Timber for China: Legal and
Illegal Pathways, Players, and Trends”, p.８, Forest Trends Working Paper.
１８）Pye-Smith, Charlie［２００６］“Logging in the Wild East: China and the Forest Crisis in the
Russian Far East”, p.５, Forest Trends Working Paper.
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to another part to the trade statistics discrepancies.
Needless to say, there are certain practical measures that the Chinese
government and Chinese traders could take to eliminate the illegal activities, but
most of the problems in Russia will have to be solved by the Russians themselves.
２.３.２ Chinese Exports
Regarding Chinese exports, most of the discrepancy is found in consumer
goods such as leather, fur, shoes, and textiles１９）. Russian trade statistics did not or
could not record the substantial trade in commodities carried across the border
through informal channels. These included the shuttle and border trade, forms of
barter exchange, and smuggling and illegal unregistered activities. Here, it is
necessary to elaborate on the special ways of trading between China and Russia.
（２.３.２.１） Shuttle trade
It is nearly impossible to grasp the real trade volume of the shuttle trade.
During Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s visit to Russia in September２００１, he
admitted publicly for the first time that its volume goes as high as $１０billion every
year. The same trade volume was confirmed by President Putin in May,２００５ in a
press conference with Chinese President Hu Jintao２０）.
Though the shuttle traders helped the Russian people go though hard times, the
Russian government viewed the shuttle trade as a“backward”way of trading, and
criticized it for bad effects on local industries. So it keeps on putting limits on it.
In the beginning, the Russian government allowed duty-free import of goods costing
less than $１０，０００, afterwards it was lowered to $２，０００. In１９９８, duty-free items
were limited to goods $１，０００ in value and weighing under５０-kilograms. As a
result, a new form of business emerged－cross-border carriers of５０-kilogram goods.
Cross-border carriers acquired the nickname of“bricks”. “Brick”stands for a
１９）Feng［２００６］
２０）Http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/２００３０５２７_press.html
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carrier and his cargo. ５０-kilogram bricks were packed on the Russian side and
then sent to various cities, as far as Irkutsk and Yakutsk. Due to the limits on duty-
free import of goods, Shuttle traders used to take“helpers”, or“pomogaiki”, who
were paid by the trip and assisted in carrying goods imported from China without
paying customs duties. Needless to say, such shipments were not registered, so
officially they did not exist at all. As of late２００１, the law stipulated that if cargo’s
weight did not exceed２００-kilograms or if its value did not exceed $１０，０００, the
customs fee is３０per cent of the value for this type of goods.
It was mentioned that in the Russian Far East, shuttle traders import up to６０－
８０per cent of the total amount of clothing and footwear imported in the region. As
a result, non-payment of value added tax and custom taxes do not provide equal
conditions for local producers, who often have to work illegally２１）. The Russian
government decided to change the situation by considerably tightening its policy
concerning cross-border shipments.
Russia’s government imposed a new law limiting the amount of goods one can
carry into the country without paying customs duties on February２６,２００６, thus
striking a hard blow to shuttle-traders. The new rules stipulate that the maximum
amount of goods an individual can bring to the country is３５-kilograms of goods per
month, decreasing from５０-kilograms per week before. According to the officials,
the law is aimed to provide competitive conditions for domestic manufacturers.
However, no measures on how to help the numerous shuttle traders are specified,
for whom this business has been almost the only way of making a living２２）. In
Primorye, the rules of cutting the weight limit will have the most drastic effect on
small businessmen, most of them having one or two small shops selling clothing and
２１）Sokolova, Alyona［２００６］“New Rules to Choke Shuttle Traders”, Vladivostok News, March
１,２００６.
２２）Ibid .
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footwear with an assortment that has to be renewed at least three times a month.
With the new rules, this practice becomes totally unprofitable, consequently
businessmen will go to China more rarely and increase prices for their goods.
Often Chinese products are preferred by Primorye residents due to their availability
and affordable prices. Experts say that the new weight limit imposed on goods can
lead to a３０per cent increase in prices and provoke more bribes to customs officials
at the border crossings. At the same time, it will hardly lead to the mushrooming
of small Russian enterprises which will be able to overflow the market with
affordable and varied goods２３）.
Since the start of the new rule, sharp decline in the border trade was observed.
In the first six months of２００６, the trade between Heilongjiang Province and Russia
dropped by４１．７８per cent comparing with the first６months of２００５. In the main
border check points such as Suifenhe, Dongning and Heihe, trade volume dropped
by４９．６３per cent,２１．２５per cent and８５．０６per cent respectively２４）.
At the same time, it was made public that the Economic Development and
Trade Ministry also prepared amendments to the Russian Tax Code stipulating to
lower the predicted cost of goods brought by individuals from the current６５，０００
rubles（$２，３０６）to１５，０００ rubles（$５３０）starting January １,２００７２５）. If this is
going to happen, because of the high tariffs and duties for clothing and shoes, this
will give another blow to the shuttle traders and Russian people.
（２.３.２.２） Gray customs clearance
Gray customs clearance became a widespread and ubiquitous method in Chinese-
Russian trade at the beginning of the１９９０s. It was a product of the social changes
２３）Ibid .
２４）Li Chuanxun［２００６］“China-Russia Economic Relations, Latest Developments”, p.３,
Reported at Asian Community Research Center Workshop, in Osaka Sangyo University,
November４,２００６.
２５）RIA Novosti, February２６,２００６.
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which occurred at the onset of Russian perestroika. At that time, in light of the
serious shortage of commodities on the domestic Russian market and under the
influence of interested groups, the Russian Customs Committee permitted so-called
customs clearance companies to provide one-stop services that cover both
transportation and customs clearance procedures for the owners of commodities.
These services were usually called“chartered truck（flight, container）and customs
payment”. In other words, the commodity owner could receive his commodities
without paying customs taxes and fees at the usual rates. But he has to pay the
customs clearance company an agreed-upon sum. Many Chinese business people
often go to the“customs clearance companies”in Russia to cut costs and to improve
efficiency２６）.
The procedure consists of the following stages２７）:
 Russian and Chinese shuttle traders in a Chinese city deliver the goods they
have bought to the warehouse of a freight company that has a license to ship
things to Russia.
 The accumulated cargo is written up as export goods from one of the major
Chinese import-export companies. Fictitious import-export contracts are signed
for this purpose, with the above Chinese corporations listed as one of the
parties. Private judicial entities comprise the Russian side. Companies of this
type are, as a rule, not destined to live long, and usually expire before their
first tax claim is dispatched（three months from their founding date）. Their
Russian counterparts are drawn up in the names either of people who have
already died or of bums.
２６）Li Jinbo and Zhang Chengli［２００６］“From ‘gray customs clearance’ to normal trade: the
trend of Sino-Russia private trade”, Russia, Central Asian & East Europe Markets（in Chinese）,
２００６No.６.
２７）Goncharov, S.［２００３］“The Chinese in Russia: Who are they?”, pp.３５－３６, Far Eastern
Affairs, Vol.３１No.３.
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 After the goods arrive on Russian territory, they pass through customs by the
customs clearance company. Corrupt customs officials stand behind the
customs clearance companies, which are carried out so-called customs clearance
by means of illegal methods. Cargo pass as at the lowest possible tariff（that
of cotton clothing for Children under five, for example）. An agreement is
struck with customs for even fur coats and leather goods to get such a rate. In
actual practice, a fixed sum that remains the same over a certain period of time
is taken for each cargo plane. At the very beginning of the１９９０s, one Il－７６
with such“general cargo”from China was worth $５，０００ at Russian airport;
today, the price has skyrocketed to $１２０，０００ and will quite probably go even
higher. Customs officials are promoting such a situation because their inability
to inspect thoroughly, either physically or with technical means, the thousands
of bundles arriving by air from China on a daily basis.
 The goods, having already passed through customs, go to a warehouse where
they are distributed to their real owners, the Chinese shuttle traders. One must
remember a critically important fact: the clearance company, as a rule, could
not provide the commodity owners with the necessary accompanying documents
and invoices. So commodities arrived at the customs house on what appeared
to be legal basis, but in fact they were undeclared contraband. That is,
conditions were created for the commodity owners to avoid taxes and other
charges at the sales stage, which at the same time because of lacking proper
customs documents, these business people are often subject to inspections by
Russian police, and their commodities are usually confiscated.
It is obvious that such as transactions are not fully registered for in the customs
statistics of both nations. In September２００３, Premier Wen Jiabao and Premier
Mikhail Kasianov made a special point of discussing“gray customs clearance”
problem in Beijing during the eighth regular meeting. In the joint communiqué, it
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was noted in particular that both states should expand cooperation to eliminate
abnormal phenomena in foreign trade and create a joint Chinese-Russian working
group to regulate trade and to rectify“gray customs clearance”. But this goal has
not been achieved yet. Because the“gray customs clearance”described above still
has its“raison d’etre”: Russian customs officials, the tax and ordinary police,
Russian and Chinese shuttle traders, Chinese manufactures, shipping companies and
most importantly the buyers of Chinese consumer goods that are not very high
quality but are surprisingly cheap２８）.
Russia alleges that Chinese exports to Russia totaled $３．４ billion in ２００３.
However, Chinese data indicated the figure is $６billion. Therefore Russia believed
the difference of $２．６ billion entered the country without paying taxes. Moscow
unilaterally increased tariffs on imports from China from the original $０．４ to $１．２
per kilogram to $３．５per kilogram２９）. This triggered a trade dispute. It is normal
that trade fictions occur given the rapid increase in bilateral trade; however, in this
case, Russia’s measures not only failed to tackle the basic problem of“gray customs
clearance”, but also disrupted the trade development.
２.３.３ Arms trade
Another reason for the trade statistics discrepancy is related with the record
about arms sales. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable secrecy regarding the level
of Russian arms transfers to China.
The Russia’s customs statistics has the category ８８, as defined in the
International Trade Centre（ITC）HS-Codes（Harmonized System Codes）,
however the data to show what and how much were exported to which country is
not available. For example, in ２００１, Chinese customs statistics indicated that
China imported almost $１．５ billion of aircraft, spacecraft, and related parts from
２８）Li and Zhang［２００６］
２９）“Talks Urged over Russian Tariff Decision”, China Daily, April２３,２００４.
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Russia, which constituted China’s largest commodity purchase of that year.
Russian trade statistics, however, omitted this category, resulting in a substantial
undervaluation of Russian exports to China３０）.
Russian-Chinese relations arms trade started in１９９２after Beijing was hit with a
US-European arms embargo following the１９８９Tiananmen Square Accident. Since
then, Russia has been the main arms supplier to China, and China became the
leading purchaser of Russian arms（see Table ４）.
For over a decade, Russian military exports to China have constituted the most
important dimension of the two countries’ security relationship and the largest sector
of Sino-Russian trade. Since the two governments signed an agreement on military-
technical cooperation in December １９９２, China has purchased more weapons
platforms and hardware-related items from Russia than from all other countries
combined. During the１９９０s, the value of these deliveries ranged up to $１billion
annually. In recent years, this figure has approached $２ billion per year３１）.
Needless to say, $２ billion per annum is quite a large proportion of total bilateral
trade.
Russia’s supply of weapons to China is being driven by market forces and
profits in the large part, given Russian defense industry woes and its hope that
profits from arms sales might contribute to its own military modernization and
reform efforts. But from time to time, Russian critics inside and outside the
military have questioned whether contributing to a stronger China is in Russia’s
interests３２）. So far Russia has imposed some limits on what it has offered China.
３０）Wilson［２００４］p.６５.
３１）For a list of major Russian-Chinese military transactions see Alyson J. K. Bailes, ed.［２００６］,
SIPRI Yearbook２００６: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University
Press, pp.４９４－４９５.
３２）For the heated debate in Moscow about arms exports to China, see Azizian, Rouben［２００３］
“The Optimists Have the Lead, for Now: Russia’s China Debate”, Special Assessment: Asia’s
China Debate, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
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Russian officials claim that the aircraft it sells to the Chinese have less capable
avionics and radar packages than in versions provided to the Russian air force. And
its arms supplies to China have been inferior to those for other nations, such as
India, despite the fact that both Asian nations are Moscow’s“strategic partners”３３）.
China is anxious to avoid becoming dependent on any supplier for its defense
needs. But in the absence of the lifting of arms embargo, the Chinese reliance on
Russia as its major external source of armament does not appear to abate３４）. China
has made it clear that it is interested in creating“pockets of excellence”weapons;
but to do so it must first obtain that foreign technology. China is taking steps to
modernize China’s military-industrial complex, by pressing the Russians to transfer
weapons technology through licensing in preference to sales of military hardware.
Not surprisingly, Moscow is reluctant to go down this path３５）. There are both
economic reasons and security reasons. The economic reason is that Chinese
engineers might learn enough from the technology to further improve the quality of
their indigenous production then China will stop or reduce the arms import from
Russia. And even worse for the Russian firms, they could yield their market to
lower-cost Chinese suppliers in the international arms bazaar３６）. The security reason
is the changing military balance between Russia and China３７）. Many Russian
policymakers and experts are increasingly concerned at the speed with which China
is narrowing the strategic gap. Suspicions about the rise of“China threat”could put
a brake on the arms sales and defense cooperation. At the same time, in order to
３３）Yu［２００５］p.２４０.
３４）Wilson［２００４］p.１００.
３５）For a detailed exploration and analysis of the distrust and tension in Sino-Russian military
cooperation, see Ming-Yen Tsai［２００３］From Adversaries to Partners?: Chinese and Russian
Military Cooperation after the Cold War , Praeger publishers.
３６）Weitz, Richard［２００６］“The Sino-Russian Arms Dilemma”, China Brief , Volume６, Issue
２２, The Jamestown Foundation.
３７）Lo Bobo［２００５］“A Fine Balance-the strategic case of Sino-Russian Relations The balance of
power”, Russie. Cei. Visions, No.１, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales.
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retain Russia’s share of China’s defense market, especially after European countries
lifted their embargo on China, Moscow could decide to sell even more advanced
weapons systems to Beijing. Russia’s dilemma over arms sales to China will
become more acute than it is now.
3 Chinese Investments in Russia
China first invested in the RFE region as early as the end of１９８０s. Due to
the geographical proximity, most of the Chinese investment is concentrated in the
RFE. There was a real boom at the beginning of the１９９０s in the creation of
Russian-Chinese joint ventures in the RFE. During１９９２－９３ there were around８００
Sino-Russian joint ventures in the RFE.
Since the very beginning of their activity in the RFE, Chinese enterprises have
been oriented exclusively toward foreign trade（for example, the exchange of
Russian raw materials for Chinese food and consumer goods）. After the end of the
business boom in trade between China and RFE during the second half of the１９９０s,
the volumes of Chinese investments, which were small anyway, in the region shrank
even more, in１９９８, the number of the Sino-Russian joint ventures decreased by２５
per cent. And by the beginning of the２１century the number further decreased３８）.
Since the beginning of the２１ century, with the upswing of Russian economy
and the improvement of investment environment, the numbers of Sino-Russian joint
ventures have shown a tendency to increase.
By the end of２００５, the aggregate capital of China in Russia was $４６５．５７
million３９）. Nearly half of it was invested in ２００５（$２０３．３３ million）. Foreign
investment in Russia in ２００５ as a whole was $５３．７ billion and foreign direct
３８）Denaeva, E.［２００４］“Economic Cooperation between the Russian Far East and Northeast
Asia: Present State, Problems and Prospects”, p.８５, Far Eastern Affairs , Vol.３２No.１.
３９）China Statistic Yearbook［２００６］.
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investment in Russia in２００５was $１３．１billion. Chinese investment in Russia was
less than１ per cent of Russia’s capital inflow４０）. The small amount of Chinese
investments are due to the facts that  China has just started to invest in foreign
countries,  Chinese investors are only marginally interested in the Russian market,
and  For the Chinese, Russia remains a risky and low-profit market in terms of
investment and technological policy４１）. Chinese investment is concentrated in
Khabarovsk Krai and Primorsky Krai.
The size of the authorized funds in these enterprises was extremely small. On
the average level, the scale of Chinese investment in the RFE is around $４０－８０
thousand. Comparing with the average level of Chinese overseas investment, which
is $１million, and the average level of Chinese foreign investment in Russia, which
is $１００thousand, the scale of Chinese venture in the RFE is very small４２）.
In order to step up and expand the scale of investment collaboration, an
agreement was reached in May ２００２ on creating an intergovernmental Standing
Working Group on Investment. It was decided that several pilot investment projects
would be chosen and given whatever help and support they need. In April,２００４,
during the９th regular China-Russia Prime Ministers’ Meeting between Premier Wen
Jiabao and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Wen announced that China
would invest up to $１２billion in Russia through２０２０.
Bilateral investment cooperation has been booming. In ２００５, Russia and
China signed investment agreements totaling more than $２ billion. Russia and
China have signed many investment agreements on several occasions such as
４０）The major nations investing in Russia are Cyprus, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Germany,
Britain, the United States, and France. They account for nearly８２per cent of cumulative foreign
investments.
４１）Livishin［２００６］p.１１.
４２）Li Chuanxun［２００５］“Economic Co-operation between Chinese Northeast and Russian Far
East”, p.５, Cross-Border Labor Migration and Regional Economic Development in North East
Asia , Edited by S. Ohtsu,２００５Minerva Publishing House.
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international trade and economics fair in Harbin, the Second Russian-Chinese
investment forum in St. Petersburg and SCO summit in Shanghai in２００６. Also
the two countries signed an intergovernmental agreement to promote and to protect
investment during the１１th regular China-Russia Prime Ministers’ Meeting. More
agreements were also signed at Sino-Russian Investment Promotion Week and the
third China-Russia Conference on Investment Promotion held in Beijing. This
event is organized by China’s National Development and Reform Commission
（NDRC）and Russia’s Economic Development and Trade Ministry４３）.
In order to meet surging domestic demands, China has been eager to increase
its investments in oil production and natural resources extraction abroad including in
Russia. However, Chinese resource-seeking investment initiatives did not get along
well in Russia. Actually, Russian authorities are reluctant to permit the Chinese
companies’s access to significant upstream assets.
For instance, in ２００２, China’s main state oil producer China National
Petroleum Corporation（CNPC）showed its intention to tend a bid on the Russian
government’s７４．９５per cent stake in Slavneft, one of Russia’s largest oil producers,
however because Russian politicians expressed concerns that Russia should not allow
important state assets to fall into foreign hands, CNPC had to withdraw its
application to bid４４）.
In the case of Udokan copper, it is still not clear that Chalco（Aluminum Corp.
of China）, China’s largest aluminium producer, can participate in exploration or
not. Chalco’s intention to bid in the Udokan copper deposit which is located in
Chita Region on the Russian border with China, crashed. Udokan, which has been
the focus of Russian, Chinese and international mining interest for a decade, is
believed to contain２７million tons of copper. As Udokan is classified as one of
４３）China Daily, November１０,２００６.
４４）New York Times, December１８,２００２.
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Russia’s strategic deposits it may only be developed by a Russian company or by a
joint venture, in which the Russian partner holds５１ per cent. And Russia’s new
subsoil law bars foreign investors from“strategic”mineral deposits. Chalco tried to
take half of a consortium planning to bid for the state-owned deposit with Urals
Mining and Metals, but did not succeed４５）.
The Sino-Russian forestry would-be joint ventures in the Far East and Siberia
have met difficulties too. In２０００Russia and China signed a framework agreement
on forestry cooperation, in April ２００６ the Russian Federal Forestry Agency
（Rosleskhoz）delegation traveled to China to discuss joint projects. Russia and
China discussed a long-term lease of one million hectares of Siberian forests as“a
pilot project on joint use of forest resources”. Although one million hectares of
forest represents a mere ０．２ per cent of Russia’s total forested area, the idea
immediately sparked harsh criticism. Environmentalists decried the idea as an
ominous sign for Russia’s taiga forests. The local politician and media showed
their concerns against Chinese migration. ANN news agency quoted Yuri Shvytkin,
a legislator from the Krasnoyarsk regional assembly, as commenting that Siberian
regions should employ Russian citizens, as now the Chinese appear to be infiltrating
Siberia, and it would be difficult to drive them back home４６）. Komsomolskaya
Pravda commented that“the project is set to become a no-win situation for Russia,
as there is hardly any point in swapping our pristine taiga for paper dollars or yuans,
the would-be joint venture is almost certain to employ Chinese nationals, who are
very unlikely to leave Siberia voluntarily, even after the expiration of the forest
lease”４７）. The fear about“the Chinese are coming”will be discussed in another
paper; nonetheless, if it is not outright hostile, it is absolutely“China unfriendly”.
４５）The St. Petersburg Times, June２７,２００６.
４６）Asian News Network, July２７,２００６.
４７）Komsomolskaya Pravda, July２８,２００６.
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The Russian government is trying to get all the“strategic resources”under its
controls. The Russian economics minister announced that the government will
restrict foreign companies’ access to ３９ strategic economic sectors, including
weapons production, the nuclear industry and mineral deposits４８）. According to the
results of a poll by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion, the
majority of Russians are dead set against foreign capital’s participation in the
military-industrial complex（８０ per cent of the respondents）, oil and gas sector,
power industry, and forestry（６６per cent to６９per cent）.
One Chinese expert on Russia Wang warned the Chinese government to be
cautious with increasing its investment in Russia. He wrote“Premier Wen’s
announcement of $１２ billion investment in Russia through ２０２０ was not well
understood in Russia. The Russians do not understand Chinese’s sincerity and
intention; they think that the Chinese are only interested in Russia’s resources and
energy”４９）.
4 Energy Cooperation
One area of economic cooperation between Russia and China that seems to hold
great promise lies in the energy sector. In the last１０ years, Russia’s oil and gas
companies have been seeking outlets for these commodities not only in the West,
but in the East as well. The prospects for the development of close economic ties
（and subsequent stability in the overall relationship）through trade of gas and oil
appears to be quite high.
４８）RIA Novosti, March２,２００６.
４９）Wang Xianju［２００５］“Increasing Mutual Understanding and Improving Mutual Trust”, p.７５,
Russia, Central Asian & East Europe Studies（in Chinese）,２００５No.１.
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4. 1 Oil and pipeline
Russian oil supplies to China have long been seen as a key element of bilateral
trade ties. In２００４, Russia provided China１２ million tons oil and oil products,
which is nearly１０per cent of China’s imports, making Russia China’s fifth-largest
foreign oil supplier. We will take an overview of Sino-Russia’s cooperation in the
energy field.
Since１９９３, with rapid growth of Chinese economy, China’s oil consumption
has been increasing constantly by４．９per cent on an average, becoming the fastest
increasing rate of all countries. Also in that year, China moved from a net oil-
export country to a net oil-import country. It is projected that China will need to
import some６０per cent of its oil and at least３０per cent of its natural gas by２０２０.
The Middle East’s share of China’s imports was５６ per cent in２００１ and could
increase to around８０ per cent by２０１０. China’s dependence on the Middle East
and the sea-lanes stretching from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea became a
matter of great concern to the Chinese government. In order to diversify China’s
import channels and minimize the vulnerability of its oil supply, the Chinese
government’s keen interest in the development of Central Asian and Russian oil
reserves and the construction of pipelines for oil transportation５０）.
While China is working hard on diversifying its energy sources, Russia is
trying to diversify its oil and gas export. Some９０ per cent of Russia’s energy
exports are to Europe, with most of the remainder going to countries within the
former Soviet Union; only３per cent goes to East Asian countries. The high world
oil and gas prices have translated Russia into an“energy superpower”and it has taken
a much more vigorous approach towards diversifying markets and pipeline routes.
Russia’s National Energy Strategy envisages that by ２０２０ the share of total oil
５０）Downs, Erica Strecker［２０００］China’s Quest for Energy Security, Rand MR－１２４４－AF, Rand
Cooperation.
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exports to Asia will rise to３０ per cent（gas exports up to１５ per cent）from the
current３ per cent, and it anticipates that China will account for by far the largest
proportion of this.
The export of Russian crude oil to China was started in１９９５ by Yukos Oil
Company（headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky）through East Siberian Railway in
small quantities. There are two routes for oil transportation. One is crossing at
Zabaykalsk-Manzhouli, while the other is through Naushki at the Russian-Mongolian
border. The railway transportation capability is limited and rail freight is expensive.
High costs and low profit margins affected the economic viability of Russian crude
oil exports to China５１）.
To facilitate the oil transportation, as early as November １９９４, Russia
suggested building an oil pipeline to China from Angarsk to Daqing, China. After
nearly one decade of negotiations, and after many promises and agreements both on
the government-level and company-level, on a trip to Beijing in September,２００３,
Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov stunned his Chinese hosts by announcing that
Moscow had decided to postpone an agreement on the Chinese route５２）. Then the
Angarsk-Daqing pipeline was foiled by the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in
October２００３５３）.
Since ２００３, the Russian government was also reportedly leaning strongly
５１）Russian regulators have moved to make rail freight more competitive. Since the beginning of
２００６, Russian Railways（RZD）cut its freight tariffs for China-bound oil by some１７ per cent.
Nonetheless, the tariffs remain high, $５９per ton for Zabaykalsk and $３９ per ton for Naushki.
RZD has indicated readiness to discuss $２８ per ton tariff as soon as supplies reach４０million
tons per year. Blagov, Sergei［２００６］,“Russia Ups Oil Exports to China by Rail”, Eurasia
Daily Monitor, Volume３, Issue１４４（July２６,２００６）.
５２）For the details of the pipeline, see Lo［２００６］.
５３）Within six months of taking office as Russia’s new president, Vladimir Putin was by the
summer of２０００ already moving hard against the capitalist-inspired oligarchs who were fleecing
Russia of its natural resources and industry with, at a bare minimum, the full complicity of the
West. Stroupe, W Joseph［２００６］“Russia tips the balance”, Asian Times, November２３,２００６.
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toward the Angarsk-Nakhodka route which was proposed by Japan and Russian state
company Transneft. Even the Russia foreign relations experts are divided on the
pipeline issue. In a situation analysis conducted by the Russian Council on Foreign
and Defense Policy and the Institute on Foreign and Defense Policy,“The panel of
experts concluded that – from the political point of view – the best solution would
be the construction of a single pipeline from Angarsk, which would then fork
toward the Russian port of Nakhodka and China’s Daqing. Another possibility
involves building two separate pipelines to those destinations. The experts argue,
however, that Russia does not yet have enough oil for these pipelines to operate at
full capacity”. “Several experts argued that a decision not to build an oil pipeline
to Daqing would seriously undermine Beijing’s trust in Moscow. It would
strengthen suspicions that Russia’s Chinese policy is being led by Washington and
Tokyo which, it is believed, seek to weaken the Chinese economy and keep China
dependent on Middle Eastern oil”,“The panel failed to reach a consensus as to
which route is more preferable. Most of them gave preference to the Angarsk-
Nakhodka route. An overwhelming majority of the experts concluded that the
choice of this route is more probable for political reasons. At the same time, they
said it would be unwise to rule out the construction of a pipeline to Daqing”５４）.
However, in December ２００４, Russia finally made its choice to build the
Nakhodka route. At the same time, Russia tried to alleviate the damage to China
by pledging to increase its total oil deliveries to China by rail to１１million tons in
２００５, from６million tons in２００４. At the summit meeting in Moscow, state oil
firm Rosneft signed cooperation deals with the Chinese oil firm Chinese National
Petroleum Corporation and Asia’s biggest refiner, Sinopec５５）.
５４）Bordachev, Timofei［２００４］“China Today: Challenge or Opportunity?”pp.１３３－１３４, Russia
in Global Affairs, Vol.２No.２.
５５）Blagov Sergei［２００５］,“China knocking on Russia’s door”, Asian Times, July６,２００５.
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On December ３１st,２００５, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov signed the
construction plan for the“Pacific Route”of the oil pipeline５６）. The main body in
charge of construction will be Transneft, the state-owned pipeline construction
company. According to Lo Bobo,“The decision to build which pipeline
fundamentally affected the direction of Russia’s oil and gas cooperation with its
Asian neighboring countries. Moscow’s decision to renege on an agreement to
build the East Siberian oil pipeline to Daqing in Manchuria arose mainly out of
concern that Russia would open itself up to possible blackmail from China as the
monopoly customer. In opting for the much longer and more expensive route to the
Russian Pacific port of Perevoznaya, Moscow hopes to reduce its dependence on
Beijing by diversifying exports to the wider Asia-Pacific market such as Japan,
South Korea, the United States, and Southeast Asia. Achieving such an outcome
would enable Moscow to dictate the terms and conditions of delivery, and exploit
energy more effectively as an instrument of geopolitical influence in the Asia Pacific
Region”５７）.
It is not clear what happened in Moscow, the east-bound pipeline took a new
turn. The Russian government subsequently decided that, while the Siberian-Pacific
pipeline project itself would be maintained for reasons of“national interest,”the
initial construction would start with the Taishet-to-Skovorodino portion, from which
a connecting pipeline would be built by the Chinese to reach Daqing. It was also
agreed that, pending the construction of the pipeline, China would receive a
substantial amount of oil by rail.
While Russia has been ambiguous about its energy cooperation with China,
Kazakhstan has given China a great welcome. As Kazakhstan currently exports７０
５６）The pipeline will run about４，４００km from Taishet in Eastern Siberia to Perevoznaya Bay in
Primorskiy Krai and have a maximum annual transport capacity of８０million tons.
５７）Lo［２００５］pp.５－６.
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per cent of its oil via pipelines passing through Russia, it is anxious to develop new
markets. The Chinese National Petroleum Company has invested $７００million in
oil development. In December２００５, Kazakhstan inaugurated the１，０００-kilometer
Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline to export crude oil to China. The $７００ million
pipeline is expected to pump１０million tons per year. According to Xia Yishan,
head of China’s Energy Strategy Research Institute, only one-half of the initial１０
million tons of crude oil per year would be supplied by Kazakhstan, while the other
half would come from Russia５８）.
Chinese media reported that first Kazakh oil arrived at Alashankou in Xinjiang
on April ３０,２００６. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has given the Central Asia
states new opportunities for energy cooperation with China. Meanwhile, early oil
supplies from Kazakhstan seemingly hastened the construction of the Russian
Taishet-Nakhodka pipeline５９）.
4. 2 Gas
The initial focus of Russian-Chinese energy discussions in the１９９０s was on the
Russian supply of natural gas to China and the construction of a gas pipeline.
China and Russia signed an agreement for the gas exploration in the Kovytkinskoe
and the construction of a pipeline to China in June１９９７. Later, the Kovytkinskoe
gas project was stalled for a variety of reasons６０）.
By the early ２０００s, Russia had proposed a variety of initiatives to China
involving collaborative efforts in gas fields in Siberia and the RFE. This included
５８）However, it would need Russian crude oil from Western Siberia coming via the Omsk-
Pavlodar-Shymkent pipeline to reach its full capacity of ２０ million tons by ２０１０. Now
Transneft appears to be planning to use the Atasu-Alashankou and Omsk-Pavlodar-Shymkent
pipelines to export crude to China（People’s Daily, April２８,２００６）.
５９）People’s Daily, April２８,２００６.
６０）Wilson［２００４］p.８６.
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the development of gas fields in Yakutia, with the construction of a gas pipeline
stretching to China; various proposals to construct gas pipelines to connect China to
the Sakhalin gas and oil fields; and the shipment of liquefied natural gas from
Sakhalin. So far, none of the long envisioned bilateral energy-infrastructure
projects has been achieved. However, the situation has apparently changed
recently.
Gazprom, the Russian biggest state gas company, signed a memorandum on
gas supplies with the CNPC, during President Vladimir Putin’s２００６March visit to
China. On October１８,２００６, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller and CNPC President
Chen Geng discussed the main conditions for supplies of Russian gas to China
through pipelines running from western and eastern Siberia, according to a Gazprom
press statement. On October１７,２００６, Gazprom began construction of the West
Siberia-China pipeline in Altai region. The pipeline link is part of an $１１ billion
Gazprom program involving two gas pipelines supplying China with８０billion cubic
meters（bcm）of natural gas annually. A western pipeline, linking the western
Siberian gas reserves to the Xinjiang region, where it will link up with China’s west-
east pipeline, will cover２，８００-kilometers and has a designed production capacity
of３０bcm per year.
Aside from preparing to build the Altai gas pipeline from Western Siberia,
Russian authorities have also indicated plans to build a new gas pipeline from
Sakhalin to neighboring China along a network of gas pipelines to supply domestic
consumers（Sakhalin-Komsomolsk-on-Amur-Khabarovsk domestic pipeline） in
RFE６１）. The proposed Okha-Komsomolsk-on-Amur-Khabarovsk-China export
pipeline, running from the island of Sakhalin off Russia’s Pacific coast via the
Russian mainland to China, would have a projected capacity of８bcm per year６２）.
６１）Blagov, Sergei［２００６］“Russia Eyes yet another Gas Pipeline to China, Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume３, Issue１５８（August１５,２００６）.
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China has very little domestic gas reserves but a seemingly insatiable growing
demand for more environment-friendly energy resources; this is one of the factors
that compelled it toward the establishment of partnerships with Russia, the world’s
largest depository of natural gas. All this indicates bright prospects for the future.
But one can never be assured that all promised gas pipelines will be realized. In
the Russian energy sector, as part of a recentralizing move, Gazprom was promoted
to be the dominant gas producer and gas exporter. But in the monopoly
environment and under strong state protection, Gazprom did not invest enough to
increase the gas production even at the time that Gazprom’s mature gas fields’
production is continuing to rapidly decline. There is no guarantee that there will be
enough gas to be exported to China; the Altai Pipeline will be laid actually,
Furthermore, will the Altai pipeline have the capacity to ensure gas supplies to
China in preliminarily agreed volumes? Can China and Russia agree on the gas
price this time?
Meanwhile, in order to avoid an over-reliance on China, Russia seems keen to
develop broad discussions on energy issues not only with China, but with other
major Asian players as well６３）. Comparing with the indecision and contradictions
regarding the pipeline to China, Russia made quick decisions for oil and gas
business with other countries such as Japan and Britain in the development of
Sakhalin. All this led the Chinese to reflect about its energy cooperation with
Russia. As a Chinese scholar wrote,“Why didn’t the Russian media write about
the Sakhalin oil and gas deal with Western states including Japan as exploitation of
Russia’s natural resources, and why do Russians view the oil export to China as
６２）RIA-Novosti, August２,２００６.
６３）According to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Ministry hopes“to start
energy dialogue with China, India, Japan, and Korea in the future.”According to Lavrov,
Moscow believes there are enormous opportunities for foreign investors in the construction and
modernization of energy facilities（RIA-Novosti, June１８,２００５）.
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becoming China’s ‘energy and raw materials vassal state’?”６４）.
In conclusion, there are chances for the energy co-operation, but there are also
tensions. China is frustrated about the slow paces of deals. One can not be too
optimistic about it.
4. 3 Electricity
Russia’s energy cooperation with China is not limited to oil and gas. In the
past five years, natural gas and electricity cooperation between Russia and China has
also increased.
In the mid-１９９０s, Russia and China discussed a project to build a $１．５billion
２，６００-kilometer-long power transmission line from Irkutsk region in Siberia to
China. This time, because that the two sides never agreed on electricity prices, the
plan was abandoned in１９９９. In the Chinese view, Russian prices were too high to
warrant investment. Like other cooperative efforts in the energy sector, various
projects to export Russian electricity to China were deterred by the lack of financial
resources.
However, the situation has apparently improved recently.
China started to import electricity from Russia６５）. In２００４, China and Russia
signed a contract that till２０１３ China is going to import electricity from Russia,
annually from１billion to２billion kilowatt-hours（kWh）６６）. Electricity supplies to
China reached３００million kWh in２００４,５００million kWh in２００５. Russia plans
to supply８００million kWh in２００６６７）.
On July１,２００５, Russia State United Energy System and the Chinese State
６４）Wang［２００５］p.７６.
６５）In１９９２, China imported１００million kWh electricity from Russia Far East.
６６）Nihon Keizai Shimbun May２７,２００４.
６７）Blagov, Sergei［２００６］“China Eyes Russia, Central Asian States as Sources of Cheap
Electricity”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.３, Issue１２３（June２６,２００６）.
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Power Grid Corporation signed an agreement on cooperation that would enable the
large-scale export of Russian power to China. During Putin’s visit to China in
March２００６, an agreement to carry out a feasibility study for energy supplies to
China was signed. In the agreement, the electricity cooperation will developed in
three phases, in the first phase, the goal is to expand the border regions’ power
transmission. From ２００８, electricity will be transmitted from the RFE to
Heilongjiang province, to ３．６－４．３ billion kWh per year. In the second phase,
from２０１０, electricity will be transmitted from RFE to Liaoning Province electricity
grid to１６．５－１８billion kWh per year, in the third phase, from２０１５, electricity will
be transmitted from RFE to Northeast China and North China to３０billion kWh per
year６８）.
Chinese firms have also pledged to invest in the power transmission
infrastructure. Xinhe, a company based in border town of Heihe, has indicated
plans to invest the equivalent of $１２ million to build a power transmission line
across the Amur River in order to prepare for large-scale sales of Russian electricity
to China６９）.
In the nuclear power area, slow but steady progress was made, and there is a
huge potential for Sino-Russian cooperation too. In the nuclear area, Russians’
needs, interests, and anticipations are very strong and passionate. The Tianwan
nuclear power plant, a major Sino-Russian project now under construction in
Lianyungang, a port city in East China’s Jiangsu Province, is an example of
collaboration in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes７０）. This project
６８）Lu Nanquan［２００６］“An Analysis about the Sino-Russian Economic Co-operation”, p.５,
Russia, Central Asian & East Europe Markets（in Chinese）,２００６No.７.
６９）Interfax, June２０,２００６.
７０）Jiangsu media reported that the first unit of the plant started generating electricity last month;
while Russian media said it would reach full capacity next month（China Daily, November１０,
２００６）.
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started from December１９９７, it was reported that the capital outlay is about $２．５
billion and Russian involvement with this project would provide work for ７００
Russian factories and job opportunities for２２０，０００workers over a three-year term.
Russians see this cooperation as test case for Russia not only the future development
for Russian-Chinese nuclear initiatives but also the ability of the Russian nuclear
industry to perform as an international player７１）. China intends to obtain
technologies for the production and assembly of reactor equipment in its next round
of construction of nuclear power plants. The Russian side tentatively agreed to
provide the technologies if it would be contracted to build another four units in
Tianwan in the future７２）.
It is reported that in the next１５ years, China will need at least３０ nuclear
power plants. Now Russian companies are bidding for ４ nuclear reactors,
competing with Westinghouse Electric Company and French Areva T&D
company７３）. On the first day of Putin’s visit to China in March２００６, he made it
clear that“cooperation between Russia and China in the energy sector includes
continuation of our involvement in the construction of new nuclear facilities in China
［emphasis added］.”Yet, until at least one of the two Russian-built reactors in
Tianwan becomes fully operational at the end of２００６, China may not contract for
additional Russian reactors. “Should the first two reactors［be］ successfully
commissioned, Russia has the rights［emphasis added］ to obtain a contract on
constructing a third, fourth, and maybe other reactors,”claimed Russian Federal
Atomic Energy Agency（Rosatom）Sergei Kiriyenko in Beijing７４）.
７１）Wilson［２００４］p.７９.
７２）Yu Bin［２００４］“China-Russia Relations: Living with Normalcy”, p.１４３, Comparative
Connections, Vol.５No.４.
７３）Lu［２００６］p.５.
７４）Yu［２００６］p.１５１.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The principal focus of this paper was to examine the economic cooperation
between Russia and China. On the one hand, economic cooperation has become an
important leg of the Sino-Russian partnership. China and Russia have become each
other’s major trading partner. Both governments are trying to bring the economic
relationship to a higher level. On the other hand, there are also problems. First,
the illegal aspects of trade practices need to be addressed. Second, comparing with
their trade relationships, the investment link remains very weak. Third, due to the
weakness of both countries’ private companies, the intergovernmental relationship is
crucial to maximizing the potential of long-term energy and infrastructural projects,
and the same can be said with such traditional spheres as arms sales.
Another focus of this paper was about the prospects of the bilateral economic
relationships. The complementary economies of both countries provide great
potentials for trade, investment and energy cooperation, however, despite some
positive trends mentioned above, it remains unclear whether Russia and China are
able to realize the potentials. The concern is that mutual mistrust will be a
stumbling block for future development. In this connection, policy-makers in
Moscow face an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, Russia has an obvious
interest in sustaining economic growth by taking advantage of its strengths – oil and
gas exports, to China, arms transfers to China; and tapping lucratively into the
growing demand for nuclear energy. On the other hand, Russians have had many
apprehensions regarding China. Oil and gas exports to China help drive the furious
pace of modernization, a modernization fundamental to its transformation into a
global power. The expanding Chinese economic power could be a concern in the
long term. Similarly, the transfer of arms and weapons technology enhances
Chinese military capabilities, which could one day be used against Russia.
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China’s appetites for Russian raw materials have made Russian leaders less
comfortable than they thought. Russia must undergo a steep learning curve to
adjust to the growing power of China and forgo the leadership position it historically
has occupied.
On the Chinese side, the twists and turns in the Angarsk-Daqing pipeline gave
the Chinese enough reasons to believe that“Russians can not be trusted”. And the
Chinese has learned that the Russia-China“strategic relationship”will not go
anywhere without coinciding with Russia’s national interests.
The debate on Sino-Russian economic relations in both countries should be
encouraged, involving the academic community in both countries and NGOs.
Moscow and Beijing should reach out to the Russian people as well as the business
communities in both countries that the realization of mutual interests in the future
depends on mutual trust. Mutual distrust could threaten economic cooperation
between the two countries.
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